The Influence of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on Broadcast Indecency Policy by Lipschultz, Jeremy Harris
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Communication Faculty Publications School of Communication
3-1996
The Influence of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on
Broadcast Indecency Policy
Jeremy Harris Lipschultz
University of Nebraska at Omaha, jeremy.lipschultz@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/commfacpub
Part of the Communication Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of
Communication at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Communication Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lipschultz, Jeremy Harris, "The Influence of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on Broadcast
Indecency Policy" (1996). Communication Faculty Publications. 81.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/commfacpub/81
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
CIRCUIT ON BROADCAST INDECENCY 
POLICY* 
jEREMY HARRis LIPSCHULTZ, PH.D.** 
The "politics" of broadcast regulation - namely, the influence 
of various political players - can be clearly seen in the case of 
broadcast indecency policy. 1 While the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC or the Commission), Congress, the White 
House, the United States Supreme Court, citizens groups and in-
dustry lobbyists have played a part in the unfolding drama, this arti-
cle asserts that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) has played the most important role 
in the evolution of broadcast indecency policy. The purpose of this 
article, then, is to explore the rulings of the D.C. Circuit during the 
past decade. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BROADCAST REGUlATION 
Mass media historian Louise Benjamin has found that even 
before the Radio Act of 1927,2 American courts were influential in 
defining broadcast regulatory principles. 3 When a state court pro-
* The ideas for this article were originally presented at "Safe Harbors and 
Stem Warnings: FCC Regulation of Indecent Broadcasting," second annual 
symposium, Villanova University School of Law, Sports & Entertainment LJ, 
Villanova, PA, February 1995. 
** Dr. Lipschultz is an Associate Professor and Communication Graduate 
Program Chair at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He teaches Broadcast Reg-
ulation, Political Broadcasting and Mass Communication Research. 
1. For a full discussion of the politics of broadcast regulation, see ERWIN G. 
KRAsNOW ET AL., THE PoLmCS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (3d ed. 1982). 
2. 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-109 (repealed 1934). Section 109 of the Act states in perti-
nent part that, "no person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter 
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication." 
47 U.S.C. § 109, quoted in, Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, Developing an Indecency Stan-
dard, The Federal Communications Commission, And the Regulation of Offensive Speech, 
1927-1964, 20(1) JouRNALISM HISTORY 3 (1994). Congress repealed the Radio Act 
of 1927 in 1934, but this prohibition was transferred into the Communications Act 
of 1934. Milagros, supra at 3 (citing 4 7 U .S.C. § 326). In 1948, this same clause was 
incorporated into§ 1464 of Tide 18 of the United States Code. Id. at 4. Section 
1464 attached to the prohibition punishment of a "fine of not more than $10,000 
or imprisonment of not more than two years or both." Id. at 3-4 (quoting 18 
u.s.c. 1464 (1984)). 
3. Louise M. Benjamin, The Precedent That Almost Was: A 1926 Court Effort to 
Regulate Radio, 67(3) JouRNALISM QuARTERLY 578, 585 (1990). The Benjamin arti-
(65) 
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tected the signal ofWGN, Chicago, from interference, the decision 
was "hailed ... as a means of clearing up the ether."4 
Prior to 1927, Congress had passed only two laws regarding ra-
dio: the Wireless Ship Act of 1910 and the Radio Act of 1912.5 
However, because the laws were not aimed at mass audience broad-
casting, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover found that self-
regulation of frequency usage was not working.6 But before the 
Second Radio Conference of 1923,7 "Hoover's attempts to regulate 
were seriously undermined when the D.C. Circuit ruled that the 
secretary of commerce lacked legal discretion to withhold licenses 
from broadcast stations."S 
de discusses the impact of a case decided prior to the enactment of the Radio Act 
of 1927. Id. at 579-85. The Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting decision settled a 
dispute between two radio stations broadcast over closely located frequencies 
whose broadcasts caused interference. !d. at 579 (citing Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves 
Broadcasting, Circuit Court of Cook County (Chicago), General No. B 136864, 
Nov. 17, 1926, in National Archives Record Group (NARG) 173, Box 83, FCC, File 
1102). The court found in favor of the plaintiff, the owner of station WGN, who 
had been operating on its frequency for a longer period of time than the defend-
ant's station, WGES. !d. at 582-83. Judge Wilson, writing for the Circuit Court of 
Cook County, lllinois, reasoned that priority of rights in broadcasting was similar 
in many ways to priority of rights in trademarks and in water rights. !d. at 583. 
Relying on parallel precedent, the court held that because WGN was established 
and accepted by the public as the station broadcast at that particular frequency, 
WGN had a right of priority and WGES was required to find a new frequency. !d. 
4. Benjamin, supra note 3, at 583. The American Bar Association, the Na-
tional Radio Coordinating Committee and newspapers from around the country 
endorsed the decision. Id. at 583-84. While it was believed that broadcasters pos-
sessed no vested rights against the government regarding ownership of broadcast 
airwaves, this decision was seen as acknowledging that broadcasters did have such 
rights against other broadcasters. Id. at 584. Similar suits were planned in other 
cities, but before they could be initiated, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927. 
!d. 
5. KRAsNow, supra note 1, at 10. Both acts primarily dealt with ship-to-shore 
and ship-to-ship maritime communications. !d. at 10-11. The acts did not, how-
ever, deal with use of offensive language or with indecency. Milagros Rivera-
Sanchez, The Origins of the Ban on "Obscene, Indecent, or Profane" Language of the Radio 
Act of 1927, 149 jOURNALISM & MAss COMMUNICATIONS MONOGRAPHS 1, 6-7 (1995). 
6. KRAsNow, supra note 1, at 11. In 1922, Hoover convened a broadcaster 
conference, the First Radio Conference, which, after two months of study, unani-
mously decided that leaving regulation to private enterprise alone was inadequate 
and recommended legislation authorizing government control over allocation, as-
signment and use of broadcast frequencies. !d. 
7. !d. Hoover called the Second Radio Conference in 1923 to address the 
problem of reception interference caused by the crowding of stations after Con-
gress failed to enact legislation putting the recommendations of the First Radio 
Conference into effect. Id. 
8. !d. at 11 (citing Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 
1923)). The court ruled that Congress had never intended that the secretary of 
commerce hold such authority. ld. 
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It is clear, therefore, that before a Federal Radio Commission 
or a Federal Communications Commission ever existed, the polit-
ical struggle over who would control the airwaves, as well as how 
they would be regulated, was underway. Many of the defining mo-
ments in broadcast regulation policy came through judicial deci-
sion-making rather than from actions of Congress or the FCC. In 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 9 for example, the Supreme 
Court dealt with the "public interest" standard10 and the right of 
the FCC to manage the public airwaves. 11 Later, in Red Lion Broad-
casting Company v. FCC, 12 the rights of viewers and listeners were 
argued to be more important than the rights of broadcasters.13 In 
the area of broadcast indecency, a sharply divided Court in FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation14 upheld FCC attempts to consider the content 
of broadcast speech on a case-by-case basis.15 But lack of clarity in 
that opinion, coupled with FCC ambiguity, led to a twenty year pe-
riod of regulatory confusion. In such a climate it should not be 
surprising that the courts, specifically the D.C. Circuit, became ma-
jor participants in the political process. 
9. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The National Broadcasting Co. suit was brought to en-
join enforcement of the FCC's chain broadcasting regulations. /d. at 193. 
10. /d. at 216. The "public interest" standard was set forth in the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, as a criterion for the exercise of power by the FCC. /d. The 
Court stated that "[t]he 'public interest' to be served under the Communications 
Act is thus the interest of the listening public in 'the larger and more effective use 
of radio.'" /d. (quoting the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (g)). 
11. /d. The Court determined that the FCC's authority to regulate was not 
limited to "technical and engineering impediments to the 'larger and more effec-
tive use of the radio in the public interest.'" /d. at 217. The Court found, how-
ever, that nothing in the Communications Act precluded the FCC from exercising 
licensing and regulatory powers consistent with the "public interest" standard. /d. 
at 218. 
12. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Red Lion was brought to challenge the constitutional 
and statutory bases of the FCC's "fairness doctrine," and to challenge the applica-
tion of the doctrine to a particular broadcast. /d. at 370-71. 
13. /d. at 390. The Court held that the FCC's "fairness doctrine" requiring 
broadcasters to afford political candidates who have been criticized over the broad-
caster's facilities an equal opportunity to respond did not violate the First Amend-
ment. /d. at 392. The Court reasoned that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters which is paramount." /d. at 390 (citing 
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); FCC v. Allentown 
Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 361-62 (1955)). 
14. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
15. /d. at 750. At issue in Pacifica was the FCC's determination that a certain 
broadcast aired during the afternoon was "patently offensive." /d. at 731-33. The 
FCC issued a declaratory warning order, stating that future broadcasts of the type 
at issue could result in the assessment of penalties. /d. at 730 (citing Pacifica 
Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975)). The majority called indecency a "function of 
context," not to be '1udged in the abstract." /d. at 742. Consequently, the FCC's 
decision to characterize the broadcast as "patently offensive" rested "on a nuisance 
rationale under which context is all important." /d. at 750. 
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II. Pouncs AND THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
The influence of the D.C. Circuit appeared to become increas-
ingly important in the late 1960s with respect to broadcast regula-
tory policy. 16 First Amendment challenges - especially those core 
challenges that the Supreme Court has tended to avoid - have 
been frequently considered by threejudge panels of the D.C. Cir-
cuit.l7 Commentators such as Erwin G. Krasnow, Lawrence D. 
Longley and Herbert A. Terry argued that "the vague public inter-
est standard embodied in the Communications Act by Congress has 
offered the courts the opportunity for a significant role in oversee-
ing the FCC."1s 
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT AND BROADCAST INDECENCY POLICY 
In order to understand the influence of the D.C. Circuit on 
broadcast indecency policy, the court's reaction to other political 
institutions in a series of cases beginning in the late 1980s must be 
examined. 
A. ACT I 
The D.C. Circuit attempted to sort out the post-Pacifica world 
of broadcast indecency in Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 
I). 19 In the 1988 ACT I case, the court held that the FCC had 
changed its enforcement standard in 1987, stating, "[w]e uphold 
16. KRAsNow, supra note 1, at 63. This increasing importance is a result of 
citizen groups raising questions "that have never been subjected to the crucible of 
judicial review." Id. 
17. /d. Usually, the constitutional challenges raised against FCC rulings con-
sist of allegations that the Commission in some way violated the First Amendment 
provisions for freedom of speech or freedom of the press. /d. 
18. Id. at 64. The Supreme Court stated: 
Congress has charged the courts with the responsibility of saying whether 
the Commission has fairly exercised its discretion within the vaguish, pen-
umbral bounds expressed by the standard of "public interest." It is our 
responsibility to say whether the Commission has been guided by proper 
considerations in bringing the deposit of its experience, the disciplined 
feel of the expert, to bear ... in the public interest. 
Id. (quoting FCC v. RCA Communications Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953)). 
19. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT 1]. In December 1987, 
the FCC issued a Reconsideration Order which affirmed three previous FCC rul-
ings and changed the hour after which "indecent programming may be aired" (the 
"safe harbor" period) from ten o'clock p.m. to midnight. /d. at 1334. Previously, 
the "safe harbor" period was from ten o'clock p.m. until six o'clock a.m. Id. The 
three rulings at issue concerned previous FCC determinations that certain aired 
material was indecent, even though the material did not violate the test previously 
used by the FCC. Id. at 1336 (citing Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987); Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987); Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 
F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987)). 
1996] BROADCAST INDECENCY PoLICY 69 
the generic definition the FCC has determined to apply, case-by-
case, in judging indecency complaints, but we conclude that the 
Commission has not adequately justified its new, more restrictive 
channeling approach, i.e., its curtailment of the hours when non-
obscene programs containing indecent speech may be broadcast. "20 
In an opinion filed by Circuit judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the 
court seemed to remind the FCC that indecent speech is protected 
by the First Amendment, and the "avowed objective is not to estab-
lish itself as censor but to assist parents in controlling the material 
young children will hear."21 Although the D.C. Circuit appeared 
constrained by the precedent of Pacifica with respect to vagueness 
challenges to the indecency policy, the court volleyed the issue back 
to the FCC by holding there was insufficient evidence to support 
time channeling to late night hours as an effective method of pro-
tection for children.22 The court found that while indecency has 
First Amendment protection, the FCC may regulate children's ac-
cess to the questionable material.23 Specifically, the court stated 
that "[b] roadcasting is a unique medium; it is not possible simply to 
segregate material inappropriate for children, as one may do, e.g. in 
an adults-only section of a bookstore. Therefore, channeling must 
20. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1334. Petitioners, consisting of commercial broadcast-
ing networks, public broadcasting entities, licensed broadcasters, associations of 
broadcasters and journalists, program suppliers and public interest groups chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the order. Id. Petitioners argued that the new safe 
harbor period violated the First Amendment by denying adults access to constitu-
tionally-protected material. ld. at 1335. Specifically, petitioners alleged that the 
order was facially invalid on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth and that 
the order was arbitrary and capricious. ld. at 1334. The court vacated and re-
manded those cases involving post ten o'clock p.m. broadcasts, finding that the 
FCC failed to offer sufficient evidence in support of the new safe harbor period. 
ld. at 1335. 
21. ld. at 1334 (emphasis added). The FCC argued that the government's 
interest was limited to "protecting unsupervised children from exposure to inde-
cent material." !d. at 1343. The court voiced its concern by instructing the FCC to 
formulate a channeling rule to promote parental control rather than government 
censorship. ld. at 1344. 
22. ld. at 1335. Petitioners argued that the new standard was "'inherently 
vague' and was installed without any evidence of a problem justifying a thickened 
regulatory response." ld. at 1338 (citing Petitioners' Brief at 39). 
23. Id. at 1340. Specifically, the court held that the "power of the state to 
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over 
adults .... " ld. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (citing 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944))). Consequently, the court rea-
soned that the offensive impact of certain words or phrases on children will not 
necessarily be overridden by the overall social value of the prograni. Id. 
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be especially sensitive to the First Amendment interests of broad-
casters, adults, and parents. "24 
The D.C. Circuit utilized the decision as a vehicle to inform the 
FCC that it "would be acting with utmost fidelity to the First Amend-
ment were it to reexamine, and invite comment on, its daytime, as 
well as evening, channeling prescriptions."25 The court instructed 
the FCC that it needed evidence to support a rule for promoting 
parental, not governmental control: "A securely-grounded chan-
neling rule would give effect to the government's interest in pro-
moting parental supervision of children's listening, without 
intruding excessively upon the licensee's range of discretion or the 
fare available for mature audiences and even children whose par-
ents do not wish them sheltered from indecent speech."26 The ACT 
I case, however, set~ed little and was only the beginning of the D.C. 
Circuit's attempt to influence the political process. 
B. ACT II 
In the 1991 case of Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 
II), the D.C. Circuit upheld its ACT I decision in spite of an FCC 
twenty-four hour ban ordered by Congress.27 The court had or-
dered the FCC to hold hearings and determine when stations could 
broadcast indecency, but "[b] efore the Commission could carry out 
this court's mandate, Congress intervened."28 Two months after 
the ACT I decision, the 1989 funding bill contained a "rider" requir-
ing the FCC to enforce indecency regulation "on a 24 hour per day 
basis. "29 Faced with new orders, the FCC abandoned plans to follow 
the ACT I orders.30 Then, in 1989, the Supreme Court in Sable Com-
24. /d. at 1340 n.12. Historically, regulation of the broadcast industry has 
been based on the unique characteristics of the medium such as scarcity of re-
sources. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). The broad-
cast medium is subject to a scarcity of resources. /d. at 396. Due to a limited 
number of available frequencies, not all those speakers who wish to gain access to 
broadcast have the capability. /d. Thus, the FCC has utilized the "scarcity ration-
ale" to justify its regulation of the broadcast industry. /d. 
25. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1341. 
26. /d. at 1344. The court stated that such a clearly stated position would help 
broadcasters understand what they were expected to do and what the legal require-
ments were to which their conduct was expected to conform. /d. 
27. 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 913 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter ACT Il]. 
28. /d. at 1507. 
29. /d. (citing Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988) (emphasis 
added)). 
30. /d. In following congressional directive, the FCC promulgated a new rule 
banning all broadcasts of indecent material. /d. (citing Enforcement of Prohibi-
tions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 4 F.C.C.R. 
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munications, Inc. v. FCC rejected a "blanket ban on indecent com-
mercial telephone message seiVices" while distinguishing dial-a-
porn services from broadcasting.31 
The ACT II court re-stated its ACT I admonishment, declaring 
that "[b] road cast material that is indecent but not obscene is pro-
tected by the first amendment; accordingly, the FCC may regulate 
such material only with due respect for the high value our Constitu-
tion places on freedom and choice in what the people say and 
hear. "32 The court additionally stated that " [ w] hile 'we do not ig-
nore' Congress' apparent belief that a total ban on broadcast inde-
cency is constitutional, it is ultimately the judiciary's task, 
particularly in the First Amendment context, to decide whether 
Congress has violated the Constitution. "33 
The court rationalized that congressional action came before 
the ACT I decision, "thus, the relevant congressional debate oc-
curred without the benefit of our constitutional holding in the 
case."34 The court argued that the precedent of ACT I and of Sable 
Communications guaranteed adult access to indecency, and limited 
regulation to that which would "restrict children's access."35 The 
court agreed with one FCC commissioner who had called the man-
date unconstitutional.36 The court stated, "neither the Commis-
sion's action prohibiting the broadcast of indecent material, nor 
the congressional mandate that prompted it, can pass constitu-
tional muster under the law of this circuit. "37 Then the court spoke 
457, codified at 47 C.F.R. 73.9999 (1990)). The court recognized that the FCC is 
bound by the orders of the legislative branch. ld. at 1509. 
31. Sable Communications Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The Sable Court 
held that a total ban on indecent telephone communications did not pass the strict 
scrutiny test because it was not narrowly tailored. ld. 
32. ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1508 (quoting ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1344). For a com-
plete discussion of ACT I, see supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. 
33. Id. at 1509 (citing Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 129). 
34. Id. Thus, despite the congressional mandate banning broadcast inde-
cency, the court asserted that such a prohibition cannot survive constitutional scru-
tiny. Id. (citing Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126). 
35. ld. The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Sable Communicar 
tions in support of its affirmation that indecent material does receive First Amend-
ment protection and a total ban on indecent material does not comport with the 
Constitution. Id. 
36. See Separate Statement of Comm'r Patricia Diaz Dennis, Dec. 12, 1988 
(citing Pacifica and ACT I). 
37. ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509. In order for a regulation to be constitutionally 
permissible, it must be carefully tailored to serve a compelling government inter-
est. ld. The government carries the burden of establishing a compelling interest. 
/d. 
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directly to the political tangle the FCC found itself in over the blan-
ket ban: 
We appreciate the Commission's constraints in respond-
ing to the appropriations rider. It would be unseemly for 
a regulatory agency to throw down the gauntlet, even a 
gauntlet grounded on the Constitution, to Congress. But 
just as the FCC may not ignore the dictates of the legisla-
tive branch, neither may the judiciary ignore its independ-
ent duty to check the constitutional excesses of Congress. 
We hold that Congress' action here cannot preclude the 
Commission from creating a safe harbor exception to its 
regulation of indecent broadcasts.3s 
The court had flexed its political muscle and cloaked it in judi-
cial responsibility. The D.C. Circuit clarified that, even though 
Congress had the original responsibility of regulating broadcasting 
as interstate commerce, and had delegated that authority to the 
FCC, it was the D.C. Circuit that was charged with protecting the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.39 While the 
court was not establishing its own absolutist ground, it was essen-
tially fashioning a limited regulatory scheme - one that would 
need to be additionally supported by forthcoming data. In the end, 
the remand of the ACT II case volleyed the political ball back to the 
FCC and set the stage for ACT Ill 
C. ACT III 
In 1993, a threejudge panel of the D.C. Circuit again reviewed 
broadcast indecency regulation, in Action for Children's Television v. 
FCC (ACT III). 40 In ACT III, a group of broadcasters, programmers, 
listeners and viewers had challenged a provision in the Public Tele-
communications Act of 1992 - the public broadcasting funding 
bill - which directed the FCC to ban indecent material daily be-
tween six o'clock a.m. and midnight.41 
38. Id. at 1509-10. This decision returned the FCC to the same position it was 
in following the ACT I decision. Id. at 1510. The court concluded its opinion by 
instructing the FCC to resume its plans to address the concerns raised by the court 
in ACT L Id. See also ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332 (detailing discussion of concerns to be 
addressed by FCC). 
39. ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509. 
40. 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated inAction for Children's Television v. 
FCC, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
41. Id. at 171. The challenge was in response to the Public Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1992. Id. at 171 n.1 (citing Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-356 § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 954, codified as In reEnforcement of 
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In ACT III, the court refused to accept the notion that much 
had changed since its previous decisions, stating, " [ w] hile we break 
some new ground, our decision that the ban violates the First 
Amendment relies principally upon two prior decisions of this 
court in which we addressed similar challenges to FCC orders re-
stricting the broadcasting of 'indecent' material, as defined by the 
FCC."42 In reviewing the FCC's 1993 implementation order, the 
D.C. Circuit agreed that children need to be protected from inde-
cency and that parents might need help from the government in 
protecting their children from indecent broadcasts.43 The D.C. Cir-
cuit, however, rejected the idea - restated from Pacifica- that 
both children and adults need to be protected from "indecent ma-
terial in the privacy of their homes."44 The court stated, "we accept 
as compelling the first two interests involving the welfare of chil-
dren, but in our view, the FCC and Congress have failed to tailor 
their efforts to advance these interests in a sufficiently narrow way 
to meet constitutional standards."45 The D.C. Circuit then identi-
fied its curious political position as a buffer between FCC actions 
and Supreme Court interpretations: "While ACT I acknowledges 
that Pacifica 'identified' an interest in 'protecting the adult listener 
Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704 (1993)). 
The provision reads in pertinent part: 
BROADCASTING OF INDECENT PROGRAMMING 
SEC. 16. (a) FCC REGUlATIONS-The Federal Communications Com-
mission shall promulgate regulations to prohibit the broadcasting of in-
decent programming-
( I) between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. on any day by any public radio station or 
public television station that goes off the air at or before 12 midnight; 
and 
(2) between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight on any day for any radio or televi-
sion broadcasting station not described in paragraph (1). 
The regulations required under this subsection shall be promulgated in 
accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, and shall be-
come final not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act. 
Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. at 
954. 
42. ACT III, 11 F.3d at 171 (citing ACT/, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988); ACT 
II, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). For a discussion of the prior decisions, see 
supra notes 19-39 and accompanying text. 
43. /d. at 177. 
44. /d. at 171. The FCC asserted three goals to justify its 1993 Implementa-
tion Order: (!)"ensuring that parents have an opportunity to supervise their chil-
dren's listening and viewing of over-the-air broadcasts," (2)"ensuring the well 
being of minors" regardless of parental supervision, and (3) protecting "the right 
of all members of the public to be free of indecent material in the privacy of their 
own homes." /d. (quoting In reEnforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast 
Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704, 705-06, t1 10, 14 (1993)). 
45. /d. at 171. 
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from intrusion, in the form of offensive broadcast materials, into 
the privacy of the home,' it does not endorse its legitimacy."46 
The ACT III court, rather than emphasizing the narrow First 
Amendment view of Pacifica, took a much more expansive position. 
The court wrote that the government has no general interest in 
protecting adults "primarily because the official suppression of con-
stitutionally protected speech runs counter to the fundamental 
principle of the First Amendment 'that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' "47 Significantly, 
the court chose to select a print media case to interpret the First 
Amendment. The suggestion is made in the first three ACT cases 
that a narrow regulatory slice has been carved - one that will only 
be justified when the governmental interest of protecting children 
is supported with hard data. The burden is on the government, 
and it is substantial. Even if the case can be made, the opinion 
accepts the notion of parental responsibility: 
Viewers and listeners retain the option of using program 
guides to select with care the programs they wish to 
view or hear. Occasional exposure to offensive material in 
scheduled programming is of roughly the same order that 
confronts the reader browsing in a bookstore. And as a 
last resort, unlike residential picketing or public transpor-
tation advertising "the radio [and television] can be 
turned off. "48 
The D.C. Circuit struck a solid blow to the foundation of broadcast 
regulation in its view that broadcast speech has core First Amend-
ment value. In challenging the notion of the intrusion of broadcast 
signals into one's home, the court pointed out that listeners and 
viewers have controls that can be exercised without turning to the 
government. 49 
Left with the government interest in protecting children from 
broadcast indecency, the D.C. Circuit restrained the FCC by apply-
46. Id. at 174 n.6 (citing ACT/, 852 F.2d at 1344 n.20). 
47. ACT Ill, 11 F.3d at 175 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270 (1964)). The court went on to note that the First Amendment protects the 
rights of all listeners and viewers, "not just of that part of the audience whose 
listening and viewing habits meet with governmental approval." ld. Thus, as long 
as obscenity is not involved, "[the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistendy held that the 
fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justifY its suppres-
sion." ld. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983)). 
48. !d. at 176 (citing Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) ). 
49. ld. 
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ing a "least restrictive means" test.50 Any ban would have to survive 
such a test, and according to the court, "the government did not 
properly weigh viewers' and listeners' First Amendment rights when 
balancing the competing interests in determining the widest safe 
harbor period consistent with the protection of children."51 While 
some sort of safe harbor might survive judicial scrutiny, the court 
wrote: "we are at a loss to detect any reasoned analysis supporting 
the particular safe harbor mandated by Congress. "52 As a matter of 
political power, the court of appeals effectively stopped Congress 
and its administrative agency in their regulatory tracks. 
On the issue of parental supervision and the validity of a safe 
harbor, the court clearly rejected the FCC argument when it wrote: 
"one could intuitively assume that as the evening hours wear on, 
parents would be better situated to keep track of their children's 
viewing and listening habits."53 The FCC argument is grounded in 
the notion that parents cannot effectively supervise the television 
and/or radio habits of their children. The court's response is clear: 
[T]he government has not adduced any evidence sug-
gesting that the effectiveness of parental supervision varies 
by time of day or night, or that the particular safe harbor 
from midnight to 6 a.m. was crafted to assist parents at 
specific times when they especially require the govern-
ment's help to supervise their children. The inevitable 
logic of the government's line of argument is that inde-
cent material can never be broadcast, or, at most, can be 
broadcast during times when children are surely asleep; it 
50. /d. at 177. The court found that the government had failed to prove that 
a six o'clock a.m. to midnight prohibition of the broadcast of indecent material 
was the least restrictive means to advance its interests in the protection of children. 
ld. (citing Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
51. ACT Ill, 11 F.3d at 177. See also id. at 177, n.12 ("As conceded at oral 
argument, petitioners do not challenge the FCC's authority to regulate 'indecent' 
material in the broadcast media by creating a safe harbor outside of which inde-
cent material may not be broadcast."). 
52. ld. at 177. 
53. /d. at 178. The FCC argued that "parents can effectively supervise their 
children only by co-viewing or co-listening, or, at a minimum, by remaining actively 
aware of what their children are watching and listening at all times." Id. (citing 
Respondents' Brief at 30-31). Because this type of supervision is not practical, the 
FCC also stated that "parents who seek to avoid exposing their children to inde-
cency face a nearly impossible task if such material is broadcast." ld. (citing Re-
spondents' Brief at 26). The court noted, however, that the FCC argument 
assumes that "regardless of the time of day or night, parents cannot effectively 
supervise their children's television or radio habits." /d. 
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could as well support a limited 3:00 a.m.-to-3:30 a.m. safe 
harbor as one from midnight to 6 a.m.54 
The protection of children argument is further tempered by the 
conclusion that Pacifica addressed only the need to protect children 
under the age oftwelve.55 The FCC, instead, had attempted to treat 
"teens aged 12-17 to be the relevant age group for channeling pur-
poses" in the ACTcases.56 The D.C. Circuit noted that "[w]hen the 
government affirmatively acts to suppress constitutionally protected 
material in order to protect teenagers as well as younger children, it 
must remain sensitive to the expanding First Amendment interests 
of maturing minors."57 
Circuit Judge Harry Edwards, in a concurring opinion, also dis-
cussed the complicated issue of indecency regulation. Beyond not 
knowing what effects indecent content might have on which chil-
dren, Judge Edwards considered what would happen if "most par-
ents would prefer to retain the right to decide."58 
[C]ould Congress still ban the showing of indecent mate-
rial? If so, on what terms? Would it be prompted by a 
"moral judgment" that indecent material is bad for all chil-
dren of all ages? And, if so, how can that be squared with 
the Supreme Court's rulings that distinguish between un-
protected "obscene" and protected "indecent" materials, 
and suggest that the ages of minors must be considered in 
assessing the vulnerability of children?59 
54. ACT III. 11 F.3d at 178. 
55. /d. at 178-79. The FCC contended that Pacifica provided the government 
with the power to restrict the broadcast of indecent speech to minors regardless of 
age. !d. at 179 n.14. The FCC therefore proposed that the First Amendment 
rights of minors need not be considered with regard to regulating indecent mate-
rial in the broadcast media. /d. (citing Respondents' Brief at 37-38). Neither ACT 
I nor Pacifica involved the First Amendment rights of teenagers. /d. Additionally, 
while the Supreme Court has stated that "the protection of children includes 
'preventing minors from being exposed to indecent' material, it ultimately struck 
down the ban on indecent telephone messages because it was not narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest." /d. (citing Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 131). 
56. /d. 
57. ACT Ill, 11 F.3d at 180. The court stated that at some point, "the govern-
ment's independent interest in shielding children from offensive material no 
longer outweighs the First Amendment interests of minors in receiving important 
information." /d. (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 
(1975); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 n.30 (1983); Carey 
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977)). 
58. ACT Ill, 11 F.3d at 185 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
59. /d. 
tr
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Judge Edwards argued that the government's interest "is tied di-
rectly to the magnitude of the harms sought to be prevented. "60 
Yet, the FCC failed to show "precisely what those harms are."61 In 
short, the ACT III opinion might have been a powerful weapon 
against any broadcast indecency regulation if the panel's 1993 deci-
sion had not been vacated in 1994. Instead, a regulatory position 
re-emerged. 
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE OPINION 
Legal scholar Jeffrey Stein isolated four questions emerging 
from the ACT III decision: 
A. Is the "generic" definition of indecency too vague? 
B. Should the FCC pursue establishing "safe harbors" for 
indecent content? 
C. Should the FCC pursue a total ban on broadcasting 
indecency? 
D. Would the FCC be better served by pursuing case-by-
case enforcement of the generic indecency definition 
instead?62 
Stein argued that vagueness should continue to be challenged by 
broadcasters, that a safe harbor is without empirical support, that a 
total ban is not constitutional and that case-by-case decisions run 
the risk of being found inconsistent.63 Surprisingly, Stein's propo-
sal called for abandonment of content regulation in favor of a re-
turn to "criminal prosecution ... rather than administrative agency 
proceedings. "64 He wrote that "it would allow triers of fact to review 
local standards in local communities to determine if violations have 
occurred. "65 Proposing that criminal prosecutions are a solution to 
the indecency quagmire, seems to be an admission that the current 
60. /d. 
61. /d. In the FCC's 1993 Implementation Order, the FCC asserts that "harm 
to children from exposure to [indecent] material may be presumed as a matter of 
law." /d. (citing 1993 Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 706-07, n: 17-18). The FCC also re-
ferred to studies demonstrating certain undefined "negative effects of television on 
young viewers' sexual development and behavior." !d. (citing 1993 Order, 8 
F.C.C.R. at 706-07, 11 17-18). Judge Edwards stated that this evidence does not, 
however, provide a significant basis for analyzing possible First Amendment intru-
sions. ACT Ill, 11 F.3d at 185. 
62. Jeffrey L.L. Stein, The FCC's 'Indecent Proposal': A Drama in Three ~cts, 'Ad-
dress at 1994 National Convention of the Association for Education in Journalism 
and Mass Communication, Law Div., at 36. 
63. /d. at 36-45. 
64. !d. at 46. 
65. /d. 
78 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JoURNAL [Vol. III: p. 65 
policy system is a mess, suggesting that the FCC should retreat to 
license renewal analysis in such indecency violations. This proposal 
models a weaker role for the FCC. Stein's view fails to recognize 
that the FCC may setve an important function in protecting broad-
casters from indecency complaints. 
One cannot assume that the FCC has failed to protect the First 
Amendment rights of free speech for broadcasters. The regulation 
of broadcast indecency occurs, not in local communities of interest, 
but in the nation's capital. Locked in the political milieu that is 
Washington, D.C., an offending broadcaster may escape direct scru-
tiny. Even where FCC review leads to a fine, these economic sanc-
tions rarely can be seen as significant to corporate group owners. 
When the President and CEO of Infinity Broadcasting (Infinity), 
Mel Karmazin, agreed in late 1995 to pay $1,700,000 to settle How-
ard Stern's indecency complaints, a move designed to clear the rec-
ord for a new round of multi-million dollar transactions, he told 
Broadcasting & Cable magazine: "we want to have a good relation-
ship with the government without in any way, shape or form com-
promising what we believe to be our First Amendment rights."66 
V. PounCAL GENERALIZATIONS 
The authors of The Politics of Broadcast Regulation identified 
seven generalizations about regulatory policy-making. 67 These may 
help us to analyze recent developments and make predictions 
about future action. The case of "shock jock" Howard Stern is a 
recent example of the process. 
1. Participants seek conflicting goals from the process. 
In the case of broadcast indecency regulation, it is not feasible 
for all involved parties to achieve their objectives. The protection 
of children, if possible, would come at the expense of diminishing 
free speech rights for broadcasters and adult listeners. The various 
positions ranging from absolute free speech to a total ban, suggest 
the political reality that a compromise with the broadcast industry is 
likely. The FCC and Infinity can settle their public dispute while 
First Amendment loyalists can continue obscure legal battles in the 
federal courts. 
66. Donna Petrozello, Kamazin: FCC Settlement Clears Way for Station Buys, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 11, 1995, at 9. 
67. KRAsNow, supra note 1, at 138-41. 
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2. Participants have limited resources insufficient to continuaUy 
dominate the policy-making process. 
79 
Broadcasters interested in challenging FCC regulatory initia-
tives must make an economic decision about the value of their ac-
tions. Likewise, programmers must weigh their options. The sheer 
slow pace of regulatory change is in stark contrast to rapid media 
change. 
3. Participants have unequal strengths in the struggle for control or 
influence. 
The D.C. Circuit, largely because the Supreme Court has 
avoided further significant review of broadcast indecency, is the fo-
rum with essentially the final opportunity for judicial review in inde-
cency cases. However, the court of appeals' authority ends with the 
publication of its decisions. During the current decade-long strug-
gle, the FCC has refused the court's suggestion to collect and ana-
lyze hard data on damaging effects. The FCC, to its credit, 
recognized that media effects research results have been inconclu-
sive. The latest round of decision-making in mid-1995, as is shown, 
appears to acknowledge that the FCC is the administrative agency 
which must, in the end, answer to Congress on broadcast 
indecency. 
4. The component subgroups of participant groups do not automaticaUy 
agree on policy options. 
The absolutist First Amendment view of Howard Stern's broad-
cast group, as well as others representing shock jock detjays, is not 
shared by all broadcasters. In fact, there have been those who have 
argued that such blue radio is bad for the long-term health of the 
industry. Likewise, members of the court of appeals and the FCC 
have disagreed over the years about the rights associated with free 
speech. The Pacifica decision of the Supreme Court is perhaps the 
best example of division. Infinity Broadcasting continues to hold 
the position in court that FCC indecency rules are unconstitutional. 
5. The process tends toward policy progression Uy small or incremental 
steps rather than massive changes. 
In a sense, the dispute over broadcast indecency arose because 
the FCC attempted something larger than incremental policy 
change in the late 1980s. The reaction from interest groups was 
swift. Judicial review slammed the brakes on any attempt at massive 
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change in policy. In one round of decision making, the primary 
question was simply whether a "safe harbor" should begin at eight 
o'clock p.m., ten o'clock p.m. or midnight. 
6. Legal and ideological symbols play a significant role in the process. 
The perception of children as defenseless against indecent 
broadcasting is perhaps the most potent symbol in this process. 
Freedom and autonomy are also important ideological symbols in 
the indecency debate. Precedent is perhaps the most significant 
legal symbol, and it surfaces when the court of appeals expresses 
being bound by it. Likewise, judicial review is an important legal 
symbol in the process. 
7. The process is usually characterized lly mutual accommodation 
among participants. 
Early on, it was difficult to see much mutual accommodation 
on broadcast indecency. As a highly polarized issue, the middle-
ground for compromise seemed difficult to discover. But develop-
ments in 1995 did, as the political model predicts, lead participants 
toward accommodation. In the case of Howard Stem's broadcasts, 
Infinity won a clear, expunged record, and the FCC won the public 
perception that they were protecting children by regulating the 
public airwaves. 
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
By May of 1995, the FCC was poised to clarify its current policy 
on broadcast indecency. Broadcasting & Cable magazine wrote: 
The FCC is putting the finishing touches on a broadcast 
indecency report it hopes will give TV and radio stations a 
better idea of what's actionable, agency officials say. The 
FCC agreed to write the report as part of last year's settle-
ment of an indecency case against Evergreen's 
WLUP(AM) Chicago. Since Chairman Reed Hundt ar-
rived in November 1993, the FCC has not aggressively en-
forced the indecency statute. But it hasn't ignored it, 
either. Indeed, late last Friday it slapped WGRF (AM) 
Buffalo with a $4,000 fine for an off-color 1993 
broadcast. 68 
68. Indecency Guide, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 8, 1995, at 113. 
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Whether there is a legitimate dichotomy between what the FCC 
judges as "actionable" and "non-actionable" with respect to pending 
complaints has long been at issue. The FCC's position has been 
that broadcasters should be able to see a distinction, but the case-
by-case review policy only tends to increase ambiguity. Further 
complicating matters is the fact that broadcast indecency policy re-
vision comes as the Congress debates a series of controversial 
broadcast deregulation proposals.69 
VII. PoLITICAL IMPLICATIONs oF REcENT CouRT AcTIONS 
Without significant action from the Supreme Court on broad-
cast indecency policy, it appears that the D.C. Circuit will continue 
to hold an upper-hand in setting long-term boundaries for free 
broadcast speech. In a seven to four decision in the summer of 
1995 (ACT Illb), the court of appeals granted the FCC authority to 
channel indecent broadcasts from ten o'clock p.m. to six o'clock 
a.m. local time.70 The court of appeals wrote, "[w]e are dealing 
with questions of judgment; and here, we defer to Congress' deter-
mination of where to draw the line .... "71 Commentators have 
noted that recent decisions such as ACT Illb act as reminders of 
broadcasters' second-class citizen status in terms of the First 
Amendment.72 The court of appeals followed the decision with 
yet another ruling (ACT IV) in July 1995 that upheld lengthy FCC 
review of complaints- from nine months to seven years.73 With-
69. Telcom bill advances in House, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 22, 1995, at 10-
11. 
70. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (1995) [hereinafter 
ACT /lib]. "Parents and the public are the winners," FCC Chair Reed Hundt told 
the press. First Amendment lawyers said they were "deeply disappointed." Christo-
pher Stern, Appeals Court Upholds FCC's Safe Harbur, BROADCASTING & CABLE, july 3, 
1995, at 10. 
71. ACT Illb, 58 F.3d at 667. In August 1995, an FCC Final Order on Broad-
cast Indecency was promulgated, deferring to the court of appeals' latest ruling 
and establishing the safe harbor time period from ten o'clock p.m. to six o'clock 
a.m. 47 C.F.R pt. 73 (1995). "The Commission is amending its rules on enforce-
ment of prohibitions against broadcast indecency so as to be in compliance with 
the instructions given by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 
Action for Children's Television v. FCC." /d. 
72. See Robert Com-Revere, The Great Satan: A Free Cyberspace, BROADCASTING & 
CABLE, Mar. 13, 1995 (discussing impact of communications decency legislation on 
broadcasting); Joe Flint, Commercial Speech Faces Supreme Test, BROADCASTING & 
CABLE, Oct. 19, 1992 (broadcasting of advertisements often not entitled to consti-
tutional protection). 
73. Christopher Stem, Court Adds 'Certainty' to Indecency Policy, BROADCASTING 
& CABLE, july 24, 1995, at 65. (citing Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 
F.3d 1249 (1995)). Hundt said the ruling "further empowers parents to shield chil-
dren from indecent programming." /d. It was clear that the support for FCC regu-
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out insulation from the court of appeals, broadcasters will face FCC 
regulation driven by a climate of political pressures. The FCC, a 
creature of Congress with White House influence through the ap-
pointment process, is very much dependent upon the general polit-
ical climate in Washington toward regulation. 
VIII. PoLITICs oF BROADCAST REGuLATION IN THE 1990s 
The generalizations made in The Politics of Broadcast Regulation 
seem to aptly apply to the case of broadcast indecency policy-mak-
ing in the 1990s. Still, one can argue that a systems model ap-
proach for understanding the process favors description over 
prediction. Needed is more comprehensive theory-building in the 
area of normative media concerns. Any political model needs to 
build upon social theory, which in turn, would help predict how 
regulation functions on an economic landscape. 
IX. IMPLICATIONS FOR FuTuRE STUDY oF PoLICY-MAKING 
Future research on broadcast indecency regulations should 
recognize previous generalizations and begin to link them to larger 
social theories of mass communication. Missing from most previ-
ous analyses is a grounding in social theory. The emphasis has 
been on summarizing and describing court decisions. These legal 
analyses fall short of providing an understanding of the law in a 
social context.74 
Legal commentators would do well to look to law reviews and 
scholarly communication journals for analyses that link broadcast 
indecency regulation to what we know about governmental and so-
cial control of communication messages. 
In addition, much has been made of deregulation through 
technological innovation. For example, Edwin Diamond, Norman 
Sandler and Milton Mueller, argued that scrambling devices could 
be employed to protect children from harmful media messages. 75 
lation by the court of appeals probably was a factor leading to the Infinity 
settlements. Chris McConnell, Infinity Pays the $1.7 MiUion, BROADCASTING & CABLE, 
Sept. 4, 1995, at 6. 
74. See, e.g., NEAL J. FRIEDMAN AND RoBERT D. RicHARDs, CoMMUNICATIONS 
LAw: REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MAss MEDIA, 340-41 (1995) (abstracting 
ACT III, but providing no commentary except quote from Commissioner Quello 
suggesting FCC will ensure that Howard Stern and Infinity follow law). 
75. EDWIN DIAMOND ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN CRISIS: THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT, TECHNOLOGY AND DEREGULATION (1983). See also Industry Battles Ratings, V-
chip, BROADCASTING & CABLE, june 26, 1995, at 16 (reporting on congressional de-
bate over television industry ratings and V-chip technology). 
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If reason is to guide broadcast indecency policy, then "deregu-
lation" must be distinguished from "policy-making." In the words 
of one analyst: "communications deregulation lacks not only an 
agreed upon definition, but also an agreed upon goal."76 The fu-
ture of deregulation and policy-making should be grounded in his-
torical First Amendment free speech principles and theoretic 
predictions about the limitation of content regulation in a free 
society. 
76. jEREMY TUNSTALL, COMMUNICATIONS DEREGUlATION, THE UNLEASHING OF 
AMERICA's COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 283 (1986). 
